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Abstract
The authors examine the effect of a trade-off between shared credit risk and liquidity efﬁciency,
among participants in Tranche 2 of the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS T2), on their
decisions to leave open, or close, their bilateral credit limits (BCLs) to a participant at risk of
imminent closure. The authors’ analysis considers a network of three banks, in a settlement
system similar to the LVTS T2. Although it is widely believed that closure of one bank is
imminent, the exact timing of the closure – during or after the settlement cycle – is uncertain. The
other two banks face an “open or close” choice regarding their BCLs to the problem participant.
Based on the expected net payoff of each choice, which includes the value of network
externalities, the analysis shows that, when the expected credit loss is sufﬁciently low, an open-
BCL pure-strategy Nash equilibrium can exist and can be Pareto efﬁcient. This result dispels the
generality of the frequent assertion that participants in the LVTS T2 will close their BCLs to a
participant that is subject to imminent closure.
JEL classiﬁcation: G21, L13, L14
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial institutions; Financial services; Payment, clearing, and
settlement systems
Résumé
Les auteurs examinent comment un arbitrage entre le partage du risque de crédit et l’efﬁcience de
la gestion de la liquidité amène les participants au Système de transfert de paiements de grande
valeur (STPGV) ayant opté pour des paiements de tranche 2 soit à continuer d’octroyer une limite
de crédit bilatérale à un participant menacé par une fermeture imminente, soit à clore cette ligne
de crédit. Leur analyse porte sur un réseau bancaire tripartite dont le système de règlement
s’apparente au mécanisme de tranche 2 du STPGV. La fermeture d’une des trois banques
considérées est globalement jugée comme imminente, même si on en ignore le moment précis,
c’est-à-dire si elle surviendra pendant ou après le cycle de règlement. Les deux autres banques
sont placées devant une alternative : maintenir la limite de crédit qu’elles accordent au participant
problématique ou lui en clore l’accès. Les avantages nets escomptés de chaque option, notamment
la valeur des externalités du réseau, permettent de montrer que, dans l’éventualité où les créances
irrécouvrables anticipées sont sufﬁsamment faibles, un équilibre de Nash en stratégies pures est
possible et peut être efﬁcient selon le critère de Pareto si les limites de crédit sont maintenues.
Cette conclusion vient réfuter l’idée reçue – souvent avancée – selon laquelle les participants au
mécanisme de tranche 2 du STPGV cloront l’accès de leur limite de crédit bilatérale à un
participant confronté à l’imminence d’une fermeture.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G21, L13, L14
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Institutions ﬁnancières; Services ﬁnanciers; Systèmes de paiement,
de compensation et de règlement 
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1  Introduction and Overview 
The Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) operated by the Canadian Payments Association is 
considered the most systemically important payment settlement system in Canada. The LVTS is 
a dual-stream system: one stream is essentially an RTGS stream (Tranche 1), and the other 
involves collateralized continuous netting with real-time finality of individual payments 
(Tranche 2). It is the Tranche 2 (T2) stream in which the vast majority of payments are settled 
each day. The principal control variables available to the participants in the LVTS T2 are the 
bilateral credit limits (BCLs) that they grant to one another. The participants’ BCLs can either 
‘stand’ at the previous day’s level, or be adjusted at the beginning of each settlement day.
1 These 
variables help determine the maximum credit-loss exposure that each participant may have to 
others in the network; the contribution that each participant must provide to the T2 collateral 
pool used to access intraday credit from the Bank of Canada for out-payments; and, the 
maximum amount of in-payment value that each participant can receive from others in the 
network, prior to making an out-payment. To determine the levels at which it will set its BCLs to 
other participants, each participant in the LVTS T2 will evaluate the potential credit loss, the cost 
of borrowed liquidity, and the likely level of liquidity inflow through receipt of payments from 
other network participants.  
 Other factors will also condition this decision. Notable among these is the likelihood that a 
particular counterparty may be closed before interbank settlement is completed for the day. Even 
more critical to the decision is the counterparty’s likely net funds position upon closure. When 
network participants anticipate the closure of another, but are uncertain as to the timing of that 
closure, as well as its net funds position upon closure, the level at which they set their BCLs to 
that participant will reflect a joint probability assessment of these two factors. Because of the 
multilateral effects arising from network interdependency among participants, each individual 
participant will, in setting its own BCL with the problem participant, take account of how other 
participants might react in setting their BCLs. Thus, the shared risk of credit loss relating to the 
bilateral relationship with the problem participant, versus the risk of liquidity loss relating to the 
multilateral network relationship among participants, will be reflected in each participant’s BCL 
decision regarding the problem institution. Participants will, therefore, need to coordinate, 
individually, on an equilibrium, defined in accordance with their BCLs, to achieve their optimal 
payoffs from network participation.  
                                                 
1.  Standing BCLs can also be adjusted on an intraday basis. They revert to their standing value at the start of the 
following day unless the standing BCL is changed at that time. See Arjani and McVanel (2006).  
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Our analysis has two objectives: first, to identify plausible conditions under which participants in 
the LVTS T2 will individually coordinate on a network equilibrium that leaves open their BCLs 
to another participant likely to be closed, and second, to evaluate the welfare-efficiency of the 
potential network equilibria derived from the analysis and model that underpins it.  
Our model proposes that the conditions for an open BCL network equilibrium are characterized 
by (i) uncertainty about the timing of closure around the settlement cycle, (ii) the expected credit 
loss, given closure, relative to the expected payoff from maintaining in-payment flows as low-
cost funding of out-payments, and (iii) the degree of symmetry or homogeneity of network 
participants. Under some plausible configurations of these conditions, an open BCL network 
equilibrium is found to exist, which can also be Pareto efficient. That said, the model can 
produce a closed BCL equilibrium that might also be Pareto efficient, but under different 
expected cost-benefit conditions. Even so, the possibility of multiple equilibria, more than one of 
which can be welfare efficient, is sufficient to rule out the proposition that one strategic 
equilibrium, whether it be a closed or open BCL equilibrium, is the only rational welfare-
efficient equilibrium for the LVTS T2 when the closure of a participant is anticipated. 
Section 2 of the paper describes the closure scenarios and their related credit exposures, to help 
define the decision space in which setting BCLs becomes problematic for network participants. 
Section 3 outlines a simplified network arrangement and the payoff structure for participants 
with respect to their BCL decisions. Section 4 defines the likelihood conditions governing the 
decisions of individual participants to either close or leave open their BCLs with the problem 
institution, and the properties of the resulting network equilibria. Our analysis in this section also 
describes how these network equilibria may change when the degree of network asymmetry 
changes. In Section 6, we draw some conclusions and policy lessons. 
2  Closure Conditions for an LVTS Participant 
In much of the past work on the LVTS T2 (Engert 1993; Dingle 1998; CPSS 2005; Arjani and 
McVanel 2006), the BCLs granted to, and by, individual participants were defined and analyzed 
in terms of their roles in controlling credit risk and systemic risk in the system. Our analyses 
focus on the roles of BCLs in the risk controls for accepting payments for settlement in the 
LVTS T2, the funding of the T2 collateral pool, and the loss-allocation rules for collateral in the 
event of a participant default that, together with the Bank of Canada’s residual guarantee, support 
the certainty and finality of payment settlement in the LVTS. From this perspective, individual 
participants concerned with possible closure of another network participant could protect  
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themselves from credit risk exposure by closing their BCLs (i.e., setting the BCL to zero) with 
the problem participant (CPA 2000; Freedman and Goodlet 1998). 
More recent research focuses on the transfer of network liquidity involved in the LVTS T2 
payment settlement. Bech, Chapman, and Garratt (2007) and O’Connor, Chapman, and Millar 
(2008) consider the role of the BCLs in funding the T2 collateral pool, and in the acquisition of 
in-payments by participants in the network. Participants use the in-payments from others in the 
network to fund their own out-payments. These analyses focus on the cost of liquidity in funding 
out-payments relative to the penalty costs of delaying such payments. The BCLs granted by an 
individual participant to others in the network directly affect the granting participant’s liquidity 
costs. If the participant grants low BCLs, it could delay in-payment receipts and, thus, may not 
be able to avoid costly out-payment delays without adding more liquidity to their existing 
positions. If others in the network react the same way, the liquidity costs and out-payment delays 
could both increase for all participants in the network.  
In this analysis, we extend the recent research to consider the relationship between the shared 
gains in liquidity efficiency from in-payments and the credit risk of participating in the LVTS T2 
in setting BCLs. In setting their BCLs, the participants in the LVTS T2 are, generally, balancing 
the potential credit risk of maintaining open BCLs with another participant against the risk of 
incurring higher liquidity costs to fund their out-payments by closing their BCLs. The BCLs 
granted to one participant by others partly reflect the probability of that participant’s closure. If a 
participant that is granted open BCLs by others in the network is widely believed to be at risk of 
closure, the assessments of the granting participants must reflect some uncertainty about either 
the timing of the possible closure, or the size of the loss upon closure. The prospect that a 
particular participant may face imminent closure may, therefore, not be incentive enough for 
other participants to close their BCLs to it. Information as to the timing of closure, the potential 
size of the credit loss upon closure, and conjectures regarding the BCL-setting actions of other 
participants will also affect the decision, when liquidity efficiency is also considered. 
To illustrate the uncertainty about whether to close, or leave open, a BCL with a problem 
participant in the network, consider the following likelihood rankings based on the basic range of 
closure events. The two factors of interest in this illustration are (i) the relative timing of the 
closure of an LVTS participant – within the LVTS settlement cycle or between LVTS settlement 
cycles (i.e., after the end of today’s cycle and before the start of tomorrow’s), and (ii) the net 
settlement position of the institution at the time of its closure. We consider two types of closure 
events. The first is an “early intervention” closure, in which the Office of the Superintendent of 
Financial Institutions (OSFI) closes a problem institution, in the absence of a default or  
4 
insolvency, to avoid the destabilizing effect on the overall financial system of a highly probable 
failure in the near future.
2 The second is a payment default. The default event can have three 
possible triggers: (i) default on a creditor payment that results in a court-ordered transaction 
freeze, windup, and liquidation of the problem institution; (ii) default by the institution on the 
settlement of its net debit position at the end of the daily settlement cycle because of either 
insufficient eligible collateral for overnight credit from the Bank of Canada or an insolvency 
assessment from OSFI; or (iii) a voluntary closure by the problem institution before completion 
of LVTS settlement when it is in a net debit position.
3  
The most likely timing for the closure of the problem institution in relation to its net LVTS 
settlement position – the joint probability ranking – is based on the following conditions. 
1.   The stated purpose of the “early intervention” policy is to allow OSFI (and the Canadian 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, if its member institutions are involved) to intervene 
effectively, at an early stage, with a problem institution under its jurisdiction, which 
includes most LVTS T2 members, to minimize losses to depositors. In practice, the 
regulators would most likely close a problem institution that participates in the LVTS T2 
between LVTS settlement cycles to limit market disruptions and losses. At that point, the 
net settlement position of the closed participant is zero. Moreover, a policy of early 
intervention indicates that closure is more likely to occur because of early intervention by 
regulators than because of a default event. 
2.   Court-ordered freezes on transactions may occur, but with a lower probability than an 
early intervention. They can come into force during an LVTS settlement cycle but with a 
timing that is presumed to be (statistically) independent of the closed participant’s net 
settlement position. Thus, the joint probability of the court-ordered closure of an 
institution with a net debit position is even lower than the likelihood of either of these 
events occurring independently. 
3.   The probability of the voluntary closure of a problem institution during an LVTS 
settlement cycle is lower than between LVTS settlement cycles, and it is generally 
                                                 
2.  See OSFI (2008) for the intervention policy. 
3.  We assume that an institution that closes voluntarily will do so at a point that limits its owners’ risk to civil 
actions by creditors and to financial loss. In other words, it would not voluntarily close within an LVTS 
settlement cycle in a net debit position, which would leave it open to civil suits, unless it fully anticipates an 
ever-increasing net debit position (up to the level of its net debit cap) by cycle end and has insufficient eligible 
collateral to cover it. To be in this situation, the institution would have had to grossly underestimate the 
magnitude of its net liquidity flows for the day.  
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perceived to be lower than either an early intervention closure or a court-order closure.
4 
However, the joint probability that the institution closes during an LVTS settlement 
cycle, when it is in a net debit position, would be higher than the marginal probability of 
voluntary closure itself. This marginal probability is not, however, considered higher than 
the probability of an early intervention closure, or court-ordered closure, with a net debit 
position. 
4.   The joint probability of closure in a net debit position because of a decision by the Bank 
of Canada to withhold access to overnight credit is certainly much lower than an early 
intervention closure or court-order closure. Since no information or policy statements are 
available to indicate that it would be higher or lower than the joint probability of 
voluntary closure in a net debit position during an LVTS settlement cycle, it is assumed 
to rank about the same. 
A relative ordering of the joint probability of closure timing by the type of closure event would 
likely rank an early intervention closure between LVTS settlement cycles ahead of any closure 
during an LVTS settlement cycle resulting from a default event. In absolute terms, the 
probability of the closure of any LVTS participant is extremely low, so that even the highest-
ranked closure event is an extreme tail event, in probability terms. Hence, the joint probability of  
closure of an LVTS participant during an LVTS settlement cycle at a point in time when the 
closed institution is in a net debit position (thus exposing other participants to a credit loss) is 
considered an even more extreme tail event.  
How large might the credit loss be if such an event did occur? Research on unanticipated defaults 
in the LVTS, even when the largest participants are at their maximum possible intraday net debit 
position (McVanel 2005; Ball and Engert 2007), involves a manageable and, in most cases, 
relatively low, credit loss for surviving participants. The average daily net debit positions of most 
participants are well within the value limits of their own contributions to the T2 collateral pool, 
with the possible exception of the very largest participants. But, even then, Northcott (2002), 
using CDIC data for part of her work on systemic risk in the ACSS, found recovery rates of 
about 75 per cent of initial credit-loss exposure relating to banking failures in Canada. The 
introduction of the structural early intervention framework (and other improvements in the 
                                                 
4.  Early intervention is designed to close an institution even earlier than the institution itself might perceive 
strategic closure to be the best strategy. And an institution that continues to operate in the face of a possible 
court-ordered closure has already demonstrated that voluntary closure is very unlikely.  
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financial safety net), since that time, would likely raise the recovery rate even further.
5 Thus, the 
combination of the low probability of a closure event involving a net debit position with the 
limited size of the credit loss (especially when asset-recovery rates are considered) yields a very 
low expected credit loss from leaving BCLs open. Indeed, the more certain that participants are 
that the closure will be between settlement cycles, which would be consistent with the likelihood 
ranking of early intervention, the less likely it will be that participants will close their BCLs.  
Even so, there is a range of uncertainty about closure timing and the magnitude of credit loss 
that, together with considerations about bilateral and multilateral liquidity cost and the penalty 
cost of out-payment delays, will require individual participants to analyze the strategic payoff of 
leaving their BCLs open to the problem participant or closing them. The next section formulates 
a simple network model that will help identify the underlying conditions for a network 
equilibrium in which BCLs remain open versus those for which the equilibrium is characterized 
by closed BCLs. 
3  The Model and the Payoff Structure 
Consider a network structure of three banks in a settlement system similar to the LVTS T2. 
Suppose that Bank 3 is a problem bank for which closure is widely anticipated.
6 Since Bank 3 
can participate in the LVTS T2 only if at least one of the other banks provides it with an open 
BCL, then Bank 3 could be in a net debit position when it closes. Consequently, any potential 
credit losses resulting from the closure of Bank 3 during the settlement cycle, when it is in a 
multilateral net debit position, would either be shared by Banks 1 and 2 or borne only by one if 
the other closes its BCL.
7  
Suppose that Bank i = {1, 2} has a binary strategy with respect to setting its BCL for Bank 3.  
It provides a BCL of zero or a positive fixed finite value (i.e., strategy space: si = {0 , Ci} for  
Ci > 0). The set of strategic profiles are defined as: si x sj ≡ {(Ci , Cj) , (Ci , 0) , (0 , Cj) , (0 , 0)}. 
The gross benefit to Bank i under the set of strategic profiles in the LVTS T2 network is defined 
as Di (si , sj). It depends on the BCL it grants to Bank 3, as well as on the BCL that the other 
healthy bank grants to Bank 3. This interdependency of Bank i’s action with those of other banks 
in the network represents the indirect network effects of their actions on Bank i’s well-being. 
                                                 
5.  See Engert (2005) for information on the evolution of the financial safety net in Canada, including the early 
intervention program, as well as the framework, process, and objectives for the overall financial safety net. 
6.  The analysis extends to N > 3 banks where N – 1 are healthy banks. 
7.  See Arjani and McVanel (2006) for details on the role of BCLs in a loss-allocation formula for the LVTS.  
7 
If Bank 3 is closed in a net debit position, the potential credit loss will be the value of Bank 3’s 
multilateral net debit position less its collateral contributions to the LVTS. This will be termed 
Bank 3’s collateral shortfall position. Let the value of the shortfall be L, where L < ∑i≠3 Vi and Vi 
is the value of Bank i’s contribution to the collateral pool.
8 Bank i’s share of the shortfall is 
defined as: αi = (si / ∑i si ); i = 1, 2 (which is low in value relative to the absorption capacity of 
Banks 1 and 2). The maximum possible loss from the intraday closure of Bank 3 is defined by 
the product of the systemwide parameter and the sum of the BCLs, granted to it, by Banks 1  
and 2 (i.e., its net debit cap). Although the maximum possible loss is clearly greater when both 
banks maintain open BCLs instead of just one of them, the actual loss upon closure of Bank 3 
will generally be significantly lower than its maximum possible value.  
Define 1 >> π > 0 as the joint probability of Bank 3 closing during the settlement cycle, while in 
a shortfall position. Although essentially a subjective private assessment, this probability 
distribution is assumed to be the same for all participants, since all generally have the same 
information. The distribution is defined on information available at the start of the settlement 
cycle when the BCLs are determined.
9 It represents the degree of anticipation of a credit loss for 
Banks 1 and 2 by leaving their BCLs with Bank 3 open. 
The payoff to Bank i of its BCL strategy combines its gross benefit net of expected loss from 
leaving open or closing its BCL with Bank 3, conditioned on the other bank’s BCL strategy. The 
2 x 2 normal form of the payoff structure for the surviving banks in the potential network 
equilibria is as follows:  
 
  C2  0 
C1  [D₁ (C1 ,C2) – π α1 L] , [D2 (C1 ,C2) – π α 2 L] [D₁ (C1 ,0) – π L] , [D2 (C1 , 0)]
0 [D₁ (0 ,C2)] , [D2 (0 ,C2) – π L] [D₁ (0 , 0)] , [D2 (0 , 0)] 
 
                                                 
8. Note  that  L = NDP3 – V3 for NDP3 is the net debit position of Bank 3 upon its closure. 
9.  The subjective probability distribution is conditioned on available prior information on the financial and 
regulatory status of Bank 3. It is independent of the magnitude of possible gross benefits or losses. Indeed,  
it is derived to evaluate the expected net payoffs of the open versus closed BCL strategies and, hence, is a 
determining factor in the individual strategic choice of Banks 1 and 2.  
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The potential equilibrium payoffs for the BCL decisions of Banks 1 and 2 with respect to Bank 
3, defined in each cell of the payoff matrix, depend on the following assumption. 
Assumption 1   Relative (gross) benefit structure 
Assume that (i) gross benefits are linear homogeneous in (C1 , C2), (ii) D1 (C1 , C2) > D1(0 , C2) 
and D1 (C1 , 0) > D1 (0 , 0) so that [D1 (C1 , C2) - D1(0 , C2 )] > [D1 (C1 , 0) – D1 (0 , 0)], and  
(iii) D2 (C1 , C2) > D2 (C1 , 0) and D2 (0 , C2) > D2 (0 , 0) so that [D2 (C1 , C2) – D2 (C1 , 0)] >  
[D2 (0 , C2 )– D2 (0 , 0)].  
Linear homogeneity states that an equiproportionate increase in (C1 , C2) will increase related 
gross benefits by the same proportion. It simplifies the analysis without much risk to the 
generality of its results.  
The first point in the second part of this assumption states that, for any given strategy by Bank 2, 
Bank 1 benefits more in terms of gross benefit from leaving its BCL with Bank 3 open than from 
closing it (i.e., before taking account of expected credit losses). This follows from the liquidity-
efficiency proposition of BCL-setting; namely, by extending a BCL to another network 
participant, the extender can obtain in-payment flows that are used to fund its out-payments. 
Sometimes called an in-payment (or liquidity) pooling effect, the sum of the BCLs granted by a 
participant caps the level of in-payment liquidity that it can accumulate and “trap” before making 
an out-payment. The cap is made effective by the fact that the extender is required to contribute 
an amount of collateral to the T2 collateral pool based on the maximum BCL that it grants. As a 
result, greater in-payment liquidity pooling requires, at some point, a higher contribution to the 
collateral pool. The last point in the assumption simply mimics the first point, with the two banks 
in reverse positions. 
The first and second elements of the assumption are non-controversial. If there were no 
individual benefits to leaving a BCL open with a network counterparty (given the BCL decisions 
of other network participants regarding the same counterparty), every participant would close its 
BCL. The last element of the assumption is, however, more technical and is critical to the 
equilibrium outcome. It states that a bank gains at least as much benefit from leaving its BCL 
open, when another does so, as it does when the others close their BCLs. This is the essential 
strategic complementarity property of settlement networks that drives common action. It 
indicates that every individual participant benefits more from a complete system (i.e., from 
maintaining open BCLs with each other) than from an incomplete system in terms of the 
efficiency of liquidity transfer.   
9 
The next step is to determine the (relative) probability conditions for the closure of Bank 3, with 
a collateral shortfall, during a settlement cycle. These probability conditions help determine 
which of the strategic BCLs set by Banks 1 and 2 formulate an equilibrium. 
4  The Analysis of the Potential Equilibria 
By definition, the joint probability of closure of Bank 3 within a settlement cycle and with a 
collateral shortfall is in the extreme low end of the range π = [0 , 1]. To narrow the range around 
relative threshold levels that support the possible equilibria, the following definition is imposed. 
Definition 1   Probability supports for potential equilibria: 
(a)  πc > 0 is the maximum probability threshold capable of supporting (C1 , C2 )  
as a Nash equilibrium; 
(b)  πo > 0 is the minimum probability threshold capable of supporting (0 , 0)  
as a Nash equilibrium; 
(c)  πp > 0 is the minimum probability threshold for which (0 , 0) Pareto dominates (C1 , C2)  
as the network equilibrium. 
The elements of the definition reflect the following logic. Given the extremely low probability of 
an intracycle closure of Bank 3 when it is in a shortfall position, and the limited credit exposure 
given this event, the participants are likely to leave their BCLs with Bank 3 open, since the gross 
benefit of doing so is at least as great as closing the BCL, under Assumption 1. Beyond the 
probability threshold of πc , this is no longer the case, and maintaining an open BCL is no longer 
optimal. Consequently, there is some probability level, πo , above which closing BCLs is optimal. 
The first issue to consider is the level of πo relative to πc. 
The last part of the definition will not affect the BCL decisions of the individual participants, but 
will help indicate whether the equilibrium outcome of those decisions is welfare-optimal, 
systemwide.
10 The issue here is the relation between πc and πp . 
4.1  Open BCL equilibria under symmetry 
To consider these probability relationships, assume that Banks 1 and 2 are homogeneous in 
business lines and symmetric in their network properties and their BCL decisions. 
                                                 
10.  In effect, this would be a network or social planner’s equilibrium-support level in probability for open BCLs by 
all network participants.  
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Assumption 2   Symmetry  
C1 = C2; D1 (C1 , C2 ) = D2 (C1 C2 ); D1 (0 , 0) = D2 (0 , 0); and D1(0 , C2 ) = D2 (C1 , 0).  
Symmetry restricts the network equilibria to the pure-strategy Nash equilibria {(C1 , C2 ), (0 , 0)}, 
but simplifies the analysis somewhat. The symmetry condition will be relaxed later in the 
analysis, to show what the comparative effects of asymmetry could imply.  
The following proposition addresses the first issue on relative probability supports.
11 
Proposition 1   Range of indeterminacy  
Under Assumptions 1 and 2 and Definition 1, πc > πo  
This proposition implies that there are three regions in the probability range π = [0 , 1]. In the 
subrange π < πc , (C1 , C2 ) is the potential Nash equilibrium. For π > πo , (0 , 0) is the potential 
Nash equilibrium. But, since the proposition states that πc > πo , there is an intermediate subrange, 
in which πo < π < πc, where both equilibria can exist. For a given range of possible shortfall 
losses upon closure of Bank 3 (zero to the maximum possible loss as defined by Bank 3’s net 
debit cap), the uncertainty subrange in probability is narrower and further out in the tail of the 
marginal probability distribution π ∈ [πo , πc ], with more of the mass of the distribution of losses 
concentrated near zero. In other words, the distribution has very ‘thin’ tails. This leads to the 
following corollary to Proposition 1. 
Corollary 1   Uniqueness of (C1 , C2 ) under certainty of no loss 
 If π = 0, (C1 , C2 ) is the unique Nash equilibrium in the intermediate subrange. 
Simply stated, if there is a commonly assessed zero probability that Bank 3 will be closed during 
the upcoming settlement cycle (i.e., certainty of no closure or, more exactly, that it will not be 
closed in a shortfall position), then other network participants will leave their BCLs with Bank 3 
open. There is no credit risk to consider, and the liquidity-transfer role of BCLs dominates the 
decision. Taken together, these results indicate that, even as π → πc , there is not necessarily a 
sufficient incentive for an individual participant to close its BCL with Bank 3. The symmetry 
assumption also suggests that all participants will individually make the same BCL decision at 
the same level of π ∈ [πo , πc ].  
                                                 
11.  The proofs for the propositions are in the appendix. The model set-up, the propositions, and their proofs are 
drawn from Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Fudenberg and Levine (1998), and Weibull (1997).  
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A more practical expression of the argument is the following: the higher is the gross payoff from 
leaving a BCL open relative to closing it, the greater will be the tolerable loss when it is left 
open. Accordingly, the probability levels defining the uncertainty range for the BCL choice are 
further out in the tail of a given distribution, and the intervals are narrower. The results do not 
indicate with certainty, however, that network participants will leave their BCLs with Bank 3 
open for any specific range of potential losses. The decision is dependent on the subjective 
probability distribution and the associated expected net payoff from doing so. Even so, the 
results do suggest that there is some subinterval in the uncertainty range, π ∈ [πo , πc ], in which 
the open BCL equilibrium (C1 , C2) will be the risk-dominant equilibrium.  
Proposition 2   Risk dominance of (C1, C2) 
Under Assumptions 1 and 2 and Definition 1, there exists a πd ∈ [πo , πc ] such that,  
for π < πd , (C1 , C2) is the risk-dominant equilibrium. 
The proposition asserts that, in the intermediate subrange, there is a probability threshold for the 
closure of Bank 3 in a shortfall position that is low enough for other participants in the network 
to keep their BCLs open. In this case, the benefits of open BCLs, in terms of liquidity transfer, 
dominate the expected credit-loss exposure for each of the individual participants. The further 
out in the tail of the marginal distribution that a loss (given closure) is, the more likely it is that 
open BCLs will be chosen by Banks 1 and 2. Outside that subinterval (i.e., in the π ∈ [πd , πc ], 
where πo < πd ), the open BCL equilibrium will not be risk dominant, and a closed BCL 
equilibrium can arise. 
Even though the symmetry assumption implies that Banks i and j make the same individual 
decision, Proposition 2 indicates that Bank i will make its BCL decision independently of Bank j, 
but in anticipation of what action Bank j is likely to take. Assumption 1 is critical to this result, 
since it states that there is still a gross benefit of Bank i leaving open its BCL, whether or not 
Bank j does so as well. Hence, for π < πd , if Bank i chooses to leave its BCL with Bank 3 open, 
it would not need to believe that the other participants in the network would do the same. If, on 
the other hand, it chooses to close its BCL on its belief that π > πd , Bank i will need to strongly 
believe that other participants will do the same, or it would be worse off than if it left its BCL 
open. Since it is riskier for a participant in the network to unilaterally close its BCL with Bank 3 
than to unilaterally leave it open, the participant is more likely to leave it open. Thus, (C1 , C2) is 
the risk-dominant Nash equilibrium for π < πd .   
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Propositions 1 and 2 focus on the probability-support levels and the relative gross benefits to 
(symmetric) individual participants to achieve an equilibrium in which all BCLs with Bank 3 
remain open. However, the actual decision process, and hence the location of πd ∈ [πo , πc ], 
depends on the net payoffs associated with this equilibrium, not just the gross benefits. The 
expected individual loss, which reflects both the size of the loss given a closure in a shortfall 
position and the loss-sharing arrangement, matters. Assumption 2 is helpful in this regard, since 
it implies that ∀ i =1, 2 , Ci = C; Di (s1 , s2) = D(s1 , s2 ); and αi = α = 0.5. Starting with an 
extreme case in terms of the probability-support levels, under what conditions might (C , C) be 
the unique Nash equilibrium? 
Proposition 3   Uniqueness of (Ci , Cj) under uncertainty 
Under Assumptions 1 and 2 and Definition 1, network participants will not close their BCLs with 
Bank 3 so that (C , C) is the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium if L < [D (C , 0) – D (0 , 0)].  
Proposition 3 follows from Proposition 2. As proposed, (0, 0) can exist as an equilibrium only if 
πo > 1. By definition, the inequality cannot hold strictly. Moreover, even if πo = 1, so that the 
participants are certain that Bank 3 will be closed during the settlement cycle in a shortfall 
position, an individual participant will still leave its BCL open, since the loss-given-default is 
less than the marginal gain from doing so. This decision will be taken even if other participants 
are expected to close their BCLs with Bank 3. An open BCL would, therefore, always be the 
preferred strategy, when an individual participant’s share of the loss from Bank 3’s collateral 
shortfall is less than the gross marginal gain from leaving the BCL open. Even if πo falls 
sufficiently relative to πd and πc as L rises, an open BCL could still remain the preferred strategy. 
It might even still be the risk-dominant strategy. 
4.2  The welfare properties of equilibria under symmetry 
Proposition 3 is unambiguous about the network preference for the (C , C) Nash equilibrium, but it 
does not imply that (C , C) is always the welfare-efficient equilibrium. The last part of Definition 
1 helps determine, along with the following assumption, the conditions for the probability 
supports under which the (C , C) Nash equilibrium is also the Pareto-efficient equilibrium for the 
network. Since (C , C) is welfare-enhancing for Bank 3, which would otherwise be forced out of 
the network and into costlier settlement or default, Pareto optimality depends on the welfare 
properties of an open BCL equilibrium for both Banks 1 and 2. 
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Assumption 3 Dominance in relative (gross) benefits  
In addition to Assumption 1, suppose that 
D(C , C) > D (C , 0) and D(0 , C) > D(0 , 0) so that D(C , C) > D (C , 0) ≶ D(0 , C) > D(0 , 0). 
Under this assumption, the equilibrium (C , C) dominates equilibrium (0 , 0) in terms of gross 
benefits (and net payoffs for given {π, α, L } and Assumption 2). Also, even if Bank i closes its 
BCL, it still receives gross benefits from indirect liquidity transfers as long as another participant 
leaves its BCL open. Note that, under Assumption 2, D(C , 0) = D(0 , C). This leads to the next 
proposition. 
Proposition 4   Pareto efficiency of the (C , C) network equilibrium 
Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 and Definition 1, then πp > πc and, if (C , C) is a Nash equilibrium 
(i.e., π < πc ), it is also a Pareto-efficient equilibrium. 
When the conditions hold for an open BCL with Bank 3 to be the preferred payoff strategy of 
each participant, the (C , C) equilibrium, as the risk-dominant equilibrium, will also be the 
Pareto-efficient equilibrium. Therefore, where πp is the threshold probability level for Pareto 
optimality, it cannot be that πp < πc. The probability support for the Pareto-efficient equilibrium 
encompasses that for (C , C) as the Nash equilibrium.  
Simply stated, (C , C) is the “first-best” equilibrium among all feasible equilibria. It also implies 
that, as long as πo < πc < πp and Assumptions 1 and 3 hold, (C , C) would still be the Pareto-
efficient equilibrium, even if it were no longer strictly risk dominant and did not emerge as the 
equilibrium outcome for the network. This result holds because the expected credit loss is low 
relative to the liquidity-efficiency gains, network-wide, from maintaining open BCLs. Moreover, 
the expected losses and liquidity-efficiency gains are shared among the participants such that no 
individual participants would bear more of the expected loss than the gain from an open BCL 
equilibrium, under Assumption 2 (symmetry).  
This Pareto-efficiency result also depends critically on Assumption 3. For example, if  
D(0 , 0) > D(0 , C), so that Assumption 3 were violated, and there were implicit penalties for 
closing BCLs when others do not, it may pay Bank i to close its BCL when Bank j does. In this  
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case, the probability support for the Pareto-efficient equilibrium is below that for the open BCL 
equilibrium (πp < πc ).
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This result is not unreasonable. O’Connor, Chapman, and Millar (2008), for example, suggest 
that if, by closing its BCL unilaterally, a participant delays receiving in-payments for its 
customers, or making out-payments to other network participants, these customers and network 
counterparties might retaliate. Participants in the network could delay their out-payments to the 
“non-compliant” participant, and its customers could shift their funds to another bank. 
Retaliation is more likely for corporate and institutional customers that have accounts with 
multiple banks than for customers that concentrate their deposit and payments business with a 
single bank. In terms of our model, if a customer tries to shift funds from Bank 3 to its account at 
Bank 2, only to find that the absence of an open BCL from Bank 2 slows the process, the 
customer may decide to shift the funds from Bank 3 to its corporate account at Bank 1, if the 
latter has kept its BCL open with Bank 3.  
4.3  Equilibria under asymmetry 
The symmetry assumption for Banks 1 and 2 ensures that the direct and indirect gross benefits 
and the potential credit losses, from open BCLs with Bank 3, are equally shared by Banks 1 and 
2. Such symmetry is not the case for the LVTS. In fact, the LVTS T2 has substantial asymmetry 
among its participants. Such asymmetry can affect a participant’s BCL strategies and the 
network equilibria. 
Assumption 4 Asymmetric banks 
Assume that the banks are asymmetric in terms of bilateral payment flows and BCLs so that  
(i) max C1,2 > max C21 > max C3,2 and (ii) C31 < C13 < C23 .  
Under this assumption, Bank 2 is the largest participant, Bank 3 is the smallest, and the BCL 
relationships are such that (max C12 - C13 ) > (max C21 - C23 ). Note that the BCLs granted to 
                                                 
12.  There are other cases in which πp < πc for violations of Assumptions 1 and 3, which relate to the relative  
size of indirect network effects. Recall that under the symmetry condition D(C , 0) = D(0 , C) so that if  
D(0 , 0) > (C , C), then πp < πc. The (0 , 0) Nash equilibrium is first-best. So, while the (C , C) equilibrium  
can still exist, it would not be Pareto efficient. If there are no indirect benefits or penalties from closing a  
BCL when others do not, D(0 , 0) = D(0 , C), then πp = πc and under Assumption 1, D(C , C) > D(0 , 0).  
In this case, the (C , C) Nash equilibrium is Pareto efficient only when it is risk-dominant. When  
D(0 , 0) < D(C , C) = D(C , 0), then πp < πo < πc, and a bank that leaves its BCL open when all other participants 
close theirs will receive indirect benefits from network liquidity transfers from Bank 3 in a value sufficient to 
compensate for the expected credit losses from doing so. In this case, (0 , 0) would never be a Pareto-efficient 
equilibrium, although it may exist as a Nash equilibrium.  
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Bank 3 are not the maximum BCLs granted by either of the other two banks. Bank 1, and to a 
lesser extent Bank 2, could raise their BCLs with Bank 3 and still not be required to contribute 
more value to the collateral pool.  
With an asymmetry specified as C13 < C23 , if Bank 3 is closed with a shortfall during the 
settlement cycle, Bank 2’s share of the loss will exceed that of Bank 1. But, if the anticipated 
closure of Bank 3 is expected to generate a rise in its out-payments, Bank 1 would benefit less 
from the additional liquidity flow than would Bank 2 by maintaining the existing BCL structure. 
This leads to the following definition and proposition. 
Definition 2   Marginal benefits and losses 
For △ Ci = Ci* - Ci, let Ci* = (1 + δ) Ci and L* = [1 +(( δ Ci ) / L ) ] L for 0 < δ < 1. 
The definition indicates that, by raising its BCL by proportion δ, Bank i can internalize the 
marginal benefit, if Bank j maintains its BCL, but share the additional risk of credit loss. 
Specifically, if Bank 1 raises its BCL to Bank 3, the marginal gross benefit can be fully 
internalized only if Bank 2 maintains its existing BCL. If the probability of closure in a shortfall 
position π does not change, the size of the loss (given closure) might still increase when Bank 1 
raises its BCL to Bank 3. The loss shares will also change in favour of Bank 2 if it does not 
increase its BCL when Bank 1 does. Bank 1’s share of the expected loss rises, while Bank 2’s 
falls.  
Proposition 5   Asymmetric BCL adjustment 
Under Assumptions 1 and 4 and Definitions 1 and 2, then (C1*, C2) is a pure-strategy  
Nash equilibrium. 
When Bank 1 raises its BCL with Bank 3, it takes on a larger share of the credit risk exposure, 
which rises with Bank 3’s higher net debit cap.
13 However, it will still pay Bank 1 to do so, if its 
expected share of the loss ( α1* π ) at the new (C1*, C2 ) equilibrium, is still less than the ratio of 
its gross payoff to the shortfall loss, at that equilibrium. In this equilibrium, there is no expected 
positive payoff to Bank 2 for following suit. The lower share of the expected loss from Bank 3’s 
closure outweighs any likely gross benefit gain to Bank 2 from following Bank 1’s lead. As for 
the welfare properties of this equilibrium, when Banks 1 and 2 are asymmetric, the adjustment to 
                                                 
13.  A participant’s net debit cap is the product of the sum of the BCLs granted to it by other participants times the 
systemwide parameter. See Arjani and McVanel (2006) for more detail.  
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a new Nash equilibrium (C1*, C2 ) may not always be a Pareto-efficient change. By raising its 
BCL to Bank 3, Bank 1 internalizes all of the potential gain, but it may impose an additional 
marginal loss on Bank 2 by increasing Bank 3’s potential shortfall, upon closure.  
This proposition is conditioned on a specific form of asymmetry among network participants, in 
which Bank 2 is a larger participant than Banks 1 and 3. Even so, it demonstrates that asymmetry 
among network participants can yield equilibria that reflect different BCL adjustment strategies 
for large and small participants. It also demonstrates that asymmetry can affect the Pareto 
efficiency of network equilibria.  
5  Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The complexity of the network interdependencies and pooling effects in the LVTS T2 requires a 
fair degree of simplification of the system, and its equilibrium payoff structure, to allow 
tractability in the analysis of participant behaviour. The risk of such simplification is that the 
general validity of the analytical results and conclusions might be affected. We believe that this 
risk is low since, despite the model simplifications, the logic of the main propositions seems 
reasonable. First, even when network participants widely anticipate the closure of another 
participant, they may rationally choose not to close their BCLs with that participant if they  
(i) are uncertain as to the timing of the closure, (ii) perceive direct liquidity-efficiency gains from 
keeping their BCLs open, and (iii) expect any loss (given closure) to be small relative to the 
potential gains from leaving their BCLs open. Second, the decision of participants not to close 
their BCLs may, under appropriate risk conditions, be the “first-best solution” for the network, 
yielding a welfare-efficient equilibrium.  
The analysis also supports the findings in other research that asymmetry among network 
participants can produce strategic equilibria for a network, additional to those found under 
symmetry. In this case, the additional BCL equilibria under asymmetry are generally consistent 
with the underlying conditions for an open BCL equilibrium under symmetry. These additional 
equilibria are not, however, Pareto efficient. Indeed, even without asymmetry among the 
participants, their BCL decisions might not always prove to be a first-best solution. Even 
symmetric participants can choose to maintain their open BCLs too long, or be too quick to close 
them, because of uncertainty about the timing of a closure.
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14.  This outcome will arise in the probability subrange π ∈ [πo , πd] in which (C1 , C2) is a possible equilibrium but 
not a risk-dominant equilibrium. Conversely, in the subrange π ∈ [0 , πo], (0 , 0) is a possible equilibrium but 
not the first-best among all possible equilibria.  
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The results of our analysis are broadly consistent with previous experience of the behaviour of 
participants, when the closure of a network participant was widely anticipated but its timing was 
uncertain. In the mid-1980s, participants in the Canadian Payments Association’s Automated 
Clearing Settlement System actively sought information from official sources about the timing  
of an anticipated closure of another participant, yet continued to take payments from, and make 
payments to, that institution. More recently, some LVTS participants have indicated their 
reluctance to close their BCLs to a problem participant without information about the 
circumstance and timing of its closure.  
Since our research question is very specific, there are really only two main policy implications to 
be drawn from the analysis. The first is that overseers and regulators need to better understand 
the complexity of the network effects and the liquidity-transfer properties on the full range of 
performance objectives, constraints, and incentives for individual participants in payment 
networks, before underpinning their policy decisions on postulated behaviour. In general, the 
behaviour of market participants is highly conditional. In markets for network services, this 
conditionality is even more complicated than in more basic market structures because of the 
network interdependency among individual participants. The pooling and sharing of liquidity and 
credit risk in systems such as the LVTS T2, as well as asymmetries in the degree and value of 
connectivity among participants, add even more complexity to the strategic decision making of 
network participants. Behavioural conjectures for payments-policy decisions that do not 
adequately take account of the complex conditions motivating participants’ behaviours can lead 
to unanticipated, and unintended, outcomes. Therefore, regulators should intervene in the 
network markets for payment services cautiously and on the basis of firmly grounded, credible 
analysis not only of the “impact” effects, but of the ultimate equilibrium effects as well. 
The second lesson is specific to the closure policy for participants in the LVTS. In their 
statements about closure policy, regulators might emphasize more clearly that, in most 
circumstances, they would not force closure of a participant during a settlement cycle. 
Exceptional circumstances in which “forced” closures, during a cycle, may occur – notably, 
court-ordered, creditor-initiated closure, or a closure because of disqualification for Bank of 
Canada credit – may still arise, but under an effective early intervention policy they are 
considered to be extremely low-probability events. If the closure policy were clear to 
participants, the probability supports could shift further out in the tail of the distribution to create 
a narrower range of uncertainty than otherwise. It could also result in a wider subrange in the tail 
of the distribution for which an open BCL equilibrium would be risk dominant and Pareto 
efficient.   
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Several potential improvements could be made to the analysis in future work. Most notably, in 
this analysis, we consider binary choices only – open or closed BCLs and, under asymmetry, 
higher or fixed BCLs. Such choices do not allow participants to adjust the “open” value of their 
BCLs as new information arrives to alter their subjective assessments, and the expected payoffs, 
of their BCL strategies. Continuity in BCL adjustment related to new information would require 
more attention to the shapes of these subjective probability distributions and to the functional 
forms for the expected net payoffs in terms of continuously valued BCLs.  
A second issue for future work relates to the policy implication favouring greater transparency in 
the closure policy. It has been noted that, because of uncertainty about the timing of the closure 
of a problem participant, participants can coordinate on network equilibria that are Pareto 
inefficient. Greater transparency about the closure policy may enhance the likelihood that an 
open BCL equilibrium for the LVTS T2 would be risk dominant and Pareto efficient. It cannot, 
however, guarantee Pareto efficiency of an open BCL equilibrium, especially if the potential for 
moral hazard is considered. If policy transparency is misinterpreted by network participants as a 
firm guarantee of no closures within an LVTS settlement cycle, BCLs may be left open, even 
when closed BCLs would be the Pareto-efficient decision. Future work might wish to consider 
whether the social cost of such a potential moral hazard problem would exceed the social benefit 
in terms of additional liquidity efficiency in the network for greater transparency about the 
closure policy. The extremely low credit losses likely to arise under the early-intervention 
strategy suggest, to us, a very low social cost from the potential moral hazard of greater policy 
transparency. But confirmation of this prior belief is warranted. 
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Appendix 
Proofs of Propositions 
Proof of Proposition 1   Range of indeterminacy 
Let Ui (Ci , Cj) denote the expected net benefit of Bank i in the Nash equilibrium (Ci , Cj).  
Under the symmetry assumption (Assumption 2), Ui = U, Ci = C and for equilibrium  
(C, C) αi = α = 0.5, ∀ i = 1, 2. Note that, for Nash equilibrium (0 , 0), L = 0 and α = 0.  
For {(0, C), (C , 0)} equilibria, L > 0 and α = 1, indicating that only one of Bank 1 or 2 accepts 
the credit risk by maintaining an open BCL. 
At πc, the maximum probability threshold for the Nash equilibrium (Ci , Cj), it must  
be that the net expected payoff for an open BCL for each of Banks 1 and 2 must be  
zero so that [(0.5) πc L = D(C , C) – D(0 , C)]. Thus, U(C, C) > U(0 , C) implies  
π < πc = {2[D(C, C) – D(0, C)] / L }. 
At πo, the minimum probability threshold for the Nash equilibrium (0, 0), it must be  
that πo L = [D(0,C) – D(0, 0)] so that U(0 , C) = U(C, 0) > U(0, 0) implies  
π > πo = {[D(0, C) – D(0, 0)] / L }. 
It follows from Assumption 1 that {2[D(C, C) – D(0, C)]} > {[D(C, 0) – D(0, 0)]}  
so that πc >πo. 
Proof of Corollary 1   Uniqueness under certainty of no loss 
When π = 0, then (C1 , C2) is a Nash equilibrium when [D(C, C) – D(0, C)] > 0 given πc from 
Definition 1. According to πo from Definition 1, when [D(C, 0) – D(0, 0)] > 0, then (0, 0) is not a 
Nash equilibrium. Since both inequalities hold under Assumption 1, then (C1, C2) is the unique 
Nash equilibrium.  
Proof of Proposition 2   Risk dominance of (Ci, Cj ) 
For this proposition to hold, it must be that Bank i believes more firmly that: (i) Bank j will 
choose BCLj = (0), when it chooses BCLi = (0) than (ii) Bank j will choose (Cj) when it  
chooses (Ci). In this case, (Ci) risk dominates (0) as a strategic choice for Bank i, i = 1, 2. 
In addition to Assumptions 1 and 2 and Definition 1, let y be the minimum probability that  
Bank j selects (Cj) when Bank i plays (Ci). Similarly, let x be the minimum probability that  
Bank j selects (0) when Bank i selects (0). Then, 0 < {x , y} < 1.   
22 
To prove Proposition 2, we need to: (i) find values of probabilities {x, y} for Bank i from its net 
expected benefit functions at equilibrium; (ii) demonstrate that x>y from conditions given in 
Assumption 1; and (iii) using the specifications of {x, y}, solve for a threshold specification  
for πd from the equality x = y and show from Proposition 1 that it must be that πo < πd < πc . 
Probability y 
From the symmetry assumption, what is true for Bank 1 also holds for Bank 2  
(and αi = α = 0.5, ∀ i = 1, 2). Then,  
U1 [C , ( y (C) + ( 1– y) (0)] > U1 [(0) , ( y (C) + ( 1– y) (0))] implies in net payoff functions  
at Nash equilibrium that 
y [D(C , C) – (0.5) π L] + ( 1– y) [D(C , 0) – π L] > y [D(0 , C)] + ( 1– y) [D(0 , 0)],  
which solves to 
y > {[D(0 , 0) – D(C , 0)] + π L} / {[D(C , C) – D(C , 0)] – [D(0 , C) – D(0 , 0)] + (0.5) π L}, 
which clearly holds, since y > 0 by definition and the numerator of the RHS is negative under 
Assumption 1 and a sufficiently low value of (π L) while the denominator is strictly positive 
under Assumption 1.  
Probability x 
U1 [0 , ((1 – x) (C) + x (0))] > U1 [(C) , ((1 – x) (C) + x (0))] implies in net payoff functions  
at Nash equilibrium that 
x > {[D(C , C) – D(0 , C)] - (0.5) π L} / {[D(C , C) – D(C , 0)] – [D(0 , C) – D(0 , 0)] + (0.5) π L}. 
Risk dominance of Ci for i =1, 2. 
Subtracting y from x and solving, then  
(x– y ) > 0 if {[D(C, C) – D(0, C)] + [D(C, 0) – D(0, 0)] – (1.5) π L} > 0 , which holds under 
Assumption 1 for a sufficiently low (π L).  
Under Assumption 1 and a sufficiently low expected loss, an open BCL with Bank 3 will be the 
risk-dominant strategy for Bank i, regardless of Bank j’s strategy. 
(C, C) as the risk-dominant Nash equilibrium 
Solving for π from x = y and defining π = πd  
πd = {[D(C, C) – D(0, C)] – [D(C, 0) – D(0, 0)]} / {(1.5) L}  
 =  {2[D(C, C) – D(0, C)] / 3(L)} – {2[D(C, 0) – D(0, 0)] / 3(L)}.  
23 
From Proposition 1, it is shown that (πc - πo ) = {2[D(C , C) – D(0 , C)]} – [D(C , 0) – D(0 , 0)]} 
> 0, where πc = {2[D(C , C) – D(0 , C)] / L} and πo = {[D(C , 0) – D(0 , 0)] / L}. Then, πd =  
{[ πc – 2( πo )] / 3} > 0 so that π c > πd . Then, (πc - πd ) = (2/3) ( πc - πo ), implying that πd > πo. 
Proof of Proposition 3   Uniqueness of (Ci , Cj ) under uncertainty 
Under Assumption 1 and the definition of πo in Definition 1, then if L < [D(C1 , C2) – D(0 , C2)], 
and even if π = 1 , (0,0) can never be a Nash equilibrium, since it always pays one bank (Bank 2) 
to have an open BCL. Moreover, (C1 , C2) is a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and if  
α L < [D(C1 , C2) – D(0 , C2)] for α < 1.  
Proof of Proposition 4   Pareto efficiency of (Ci , Cj ) 
The Nash equilibrium (0, 0) can Pareto dominate the Nash equilibrium (Ci , Cj) only if  
[D(C, C) – D(0, 0)] < [(0.5) πL], which violates Assumptions 1 and 3 when Assumption 2  
holds. Defining the threshold value for πp where [D(C, C) – D(0, 0)] = [(0.5) πp L] and solving, 
then πp = {(2[D(C, C) – D(0, 0)]) / L } > πc .  
Corollary 2   Pareto efficiency of (0 , 0 ) 
If Assumptions 1 and 3 are replaced by the assumption D(0, 0) > D(0, C) = D(C, C) when 
Assumption 2 holds, implying no indirect liquidity benefits from open BCLs, only then can 
(0, 0) be a Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 5   Asymmetric BCL adjustment 
With the adoption of Assumption 4 and with Definition 2, we need to show that (C1*, C2) is a 
Nash equilibrium. To do so, we need to show the conditions individually for which Bank 1 will 
raise its BCL when Bank 2 selects to maintain its BCL and, then, show the conditions under 
which Bank 2 chooses to maintain its BCL when Bank 1 raises its.  
Bank 1 conditions 
Bank 1 will raise its BCL when Bank 2 chooses to hold its constant if 
U1 (C1*, C2) > U1 (C1 , C2), which is strictly positive and implies 
D1[(1 + δ)C1 , C2 ] – {[(1 + δ)C1 / ((1 + δ)C1 + C2)] · [1 + (δ C1/ L)] · π L} >  
  D1[C1 , C2] - {[( C1 / ( C1 + C2)] · π L}, 
which can be re-expressed as 
D1[(1 + δ)C1 , C2 ] - D1[C1 , C2 ] > {[((1 + δ)C1 / ((1 + δ)C1 + C2) · (1+ (δ C1 / L)) 
   -  ( C1 / ( C1 + C2)] · π L}. 
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We need to show that this condition holds for boundary conditions: C1* ∈ [0 , C2]. 
For C1* = 0 => C1 = 0 
D1[(0 , C2 ] - D1[0 , C2 ] = 0 under Assumption 1, which indicates that the condition holds at the 
lower bound as a strict equality.  
For C1* = C2 , the inequality solves to  
D1[C2 , C2 ] - D1[C1 , C2 ] > ( π / 2) · {[(1 + δ)·L / (2 + δ)] + [δ · C2 / (1 + δ)]} at the boundary  
by definition. The inequality will hold for a small enough L.  
Bank 2 conditions 
Bank 2 will maintain its existing BCL when Bank 1 raises its BCL with Bank 3 if 
U2 (C1*, C2) > U2 (C1* , C2*) where C2* = (1 + δ)C2, which implies under Assumption 1,  
D2[(1 + δ)C1 , C2 ] – [(1 + δ) D2[C1 , C2 ] > {[(C2 / ((1 + δ)C1 + C2) · (1+ ( δ C1 / L))] – 
   [((C2 / (C1 + C2))·(1 + δ)(C1 + C2)/ L)]} · π L. 
For boundary conditions: C1* ∈ [0 , C2*]: 
At C1* = 0 => C1 = 0,  
the inequality above solves to: D2[0 , C2 ] < {[ (1+ δ)C2 / L ] – 1} · [ π L / δ ]. 
At C1* = C2* = (1 + δ)C2 => C1 = C2, under Assumption 1 (linear homogeneity), the inequality 
solves to D2[ C2 , C2 ] < {[2(1 + δ) · δ · C2)] / L }· [ π L / (2 + δ ) · δ ]. 
The inequality holds at both boundaries for a large enough C2. 
 